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Preface 
 
The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) implies a range of cyber security issues. As 
this background paper illustrates, this is specifically the case for connected vehicles, which 
are connected to the Internet and location services. This is also the case in the field of 
connected implantable or wearable medical devices, because most of these also require 
some form of connection to external networks. 
 
It is important to address those issues, otherwise the trust of the public – in this case, car 
and road users or patients – can be eroded. When trust is lacking, opportunities that IoT-
related technologies offer cannot be fully exhausted, and benefits to society and the 
economy will be suboptimal. 
 
Cyber security risks in the IoT are worth exploring in-depth because of their particular nature 
as adversarial risks with a deliberate intention to cause harm, which is outside of the scope 
of standard risks. When a cyber risk has negative consequences on a person’s health, 
integrity or even life, or causes breaches to privacy, the stakes are quite different from when 
the loss is financial or reputational. Vulnerabilities can also extend to other systems. Thus, 
the implications of relying on insecure connectivity for the IoT, involving devices and 
communication channels, are wide ranging. 
 
What is not clear is what type of risk management can be implemented, on top of security 
measures. Can cyber security concerns be dealt with through technical means only, i.e. cyber 
security solutions, which industry can implement because they make sense in economic and 
business terms? Are new or revised standards needed, with appropriate certification 
schemes? Which other arrangements, such as public regulation or insurance incentives and 
schemes must be put in place? 
  
Ultimately, it is society that decides on whether or not it wants to adopt disruptive 
technologies such as those involved in the IoT with increased internet access and other 
forms of connectivity.  
• Society may decide based on its evaluation of expected benefits such as performance, 
convenience or comfort; or 
• especially if a serious accident happens, society may conclude that, in its opinion, the 
risks exceed the benefits; or 
• it may decide based on a complete analysis of the trade-offs between various risks 
and benefits, or prepare to revise its decision as the IoT develops 
IRGC recommends that actors in this field engage into a complete analysis of the trade-offs 
involved, so that society makes the best possible informed decision. IRGC will provide a 
space for discussion about various ways to govern cyber security risks during a multi-
disciplinary expert workshop on 15-16 November 2016. 
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Introduction 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) drastically changes how individuals interact with objects, 
wherever those may be located. It creates significant opportunities for more efficiency, 
convenience and comfort and can improve performance and reduce inefficiencies in 
numerous sectors. Specific promising gains and applications include traffic efficiency thanks 
to connectivity between vehicles and with infrastructure (towards autonomous vehicles), 
the provision of personal health care (mHealth or eHealth1) through implantable or 
wearable connected medical devices including apps (Software as a Medical Device), smart 
homes and buildings, smart factories and supply chains,  smart cities, and smart grids. IoT 
technologies include specific infrastructure with sensors and processors for wired and 
wireless applications, and a range of connectivity and security solutions. 
Figure 1: Smart Solutions for the IoT.  
Courtesy from NXP - Available at: http://www.nxp.com/applications/solutions-for-the-iot-and-adas/smart-connected-
solutions-for-the-iot:SMART-CONNECTED-SOLUTIONS 
The safe and secure use of IoT is concerned with cyber security issues and vulnerabilities. 
These issues associated with connected vehicles and with connected medical devices are 
similar to other applications of the IoT. However, what makes these applications and their 
networked environment special is the potential direct negative impact on the physical safety 
and the security of road users and patients, if cyber security vulnerabilities are exploited. 
The IoT has the potential to play a transformational role in transportation and in health care, 
but could also directly expose road users, patients and health care organisations to new 
safety and security risks. Unintended consequences of increased connectivity and 
  Not for circulation 
 6 
automation in car driving and of the digitalisation of health care include the risk of being 
hacked, being infected with malware and being vulnerable to unauthorised access, which 
may trigger risk of a physical car accident or adverse health outcomes. It also includes a risk 
of accident caused by unintended error or negligence, because of the increasing complexity 
of the cyber-physical systems. 
Those issues will be addressed in the expert workshop. 
 
The workshop will: 
• Explore the extent to which cyber security is a true concern for connected cars 
and medical devices (implantable or wearable) 
• Review what technological solutions exist or are needed, and what types of new 
governance arrangements would be necessary 
• Aim to elaborate practical guidelines or recommendations for improving cyber 
security and creating trust in connectivity of the IoT 
 
Defining the context 
In the context of high expectations and promises of the Internet of Things (IoT), this paper 
focuses on: 
• Connected vehicles (CVs), in which connectivity between vehicles (V2V) or with 
infrastructure (V2I) is needed for advanced levels of autonomy. 
• Implantable or wearable medical devices that are connected to a network (NMDs). 
We include implantable medical devices such as insulin pumps, pacemakers or 
defibrillators as well as wearable devices for medical monitoring for better health 
outcome, when there is a connection between a patient and his healthcare provider, 
whether in a hospital setting (infusion pumps, ICU monitoring) and home/mobile 
monitoring equipment. Wearable devices for healthy lifestyle monitoring are 
included to the extent that they represent vulnerable entry points to healthcare or 
other critical systems, such as in the October 2016 Dyn attack in the USa. 
When connected to the Internet, these 'things' are vulnerable to cyber security threats and 
consequently pose additional risks. Serious connectivity malfunctioning could affect the 
critical services provided by the IoT. 
 
                                                     
a The October 2016 Dyn cyberattack took place on October 21, 2016, and involved multiple denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks targeting systems operated by Domain Name System (DNS) provider Dyn which made major 
Internet platforms and services unavailable to large swaths of users in Europe and North America. The groups 
Anonymous and New World Hackers claimed responsibility for the attack.(...) Dyn disclosed that (...) the attack 
was a botnet coordinated through a large number of Internet of things-enabled (IoT) devices, including 
cameras, home routers, and baby monitors, that had been infected with Mirai malware. October 2016 Dyn 
cyberattack. (2016, October 26). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 06:45, October 26, 2016, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=October_2016_Dyn_cyberattack&oldid=746252416  
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Promises and associated issues 
The IoT promises to deliver significant improvement to the quality of life and efficiency gains 
across a wide range of sectors. To make this happen, policymakers, regulators and other 
stakeholders work to establish a regulatory context that facilitates the IoT, but also deals 
with key physical safety, economic and legal issues, including data privacy and data security, 
intellectual property rights, legal liability (who is responsible in case of incident, product 
liability and tort liability). It also addresses issues such as the possibility that greater 
automation displaces certain manual work, and the risk that social and economic impact and 
inequalities will increase and exclude certain groups from the benefits.  
Manufacturers routinely rely on smart sensors and sensor data to optimise the operation of 
devices, for example in supply chains. What is new is that the data is used not only for 
monitoring, detection and control, but increasingly for management: optimisation and 
prediction. IT systems, and progressively artificial intelligence, analyse the data and make 
autonomous decisions about management actions. If the data is missing or compromised, as 
a result of either unintentional user error, defect or intentional intrusion in the system, the 
output may have catastrophic consequences. Also, widespread sensor placement, network 
connectivity and sophisticated data analytics now enable applications that aggregate large 
amounts of data generated by devices connected to the IoT, which are often private. This 
data may belong to an individual who may decide or be obliged by law to share them with 
other people, in exchange for expected benefits. As individuals let others have access to the 
data, they may or may not be aware that they expose themselves to risks that they may be 
unable to control. Consequently, if things turn out negatively, they may not be able to stop, 
reverse or modify the process.  
Applications to connected vehicles and medical devices, cyber security concerns 
There is a large variety of applications that use the IoT. Some are primarily for convenience, 
leisure and comfort, while others involve physical safety, privacy and personal data. 
• Autonomous vehicles (AVs) 
When autonomous vehicles are connected to other vehicles or to infrastructure, it 
enables more efficient driving: vehicles communicate and cooperate with each other 
and with infrastructure. More efficient driving is linked to numerous benefits, 
including reducing traffic congestion, air pollution, CO2 emissions and new mobility 
services. GPS navigation is only available if cars are connected to mapping services, 
based on maps elaborated by private or public entities, which deliver information 
that must be trusted by car users.  
The automotive industry uses the IoT for connecting cars, as part of the move 
towards autonomous driving. In the Chrysler Jeep Hack in 20142, key systems such as 
engine management and braking systems were shown to be accessible using an 
external cellular connection. In March 2016, the US computer emergency readiness 
team (US-CERT) issued a warning through a joint FBI, Department of Transportation 
and NHTSA Public Service Announcement that vehicles are increasingly vulnerable to 
remote exploits.3 
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• Networked medical devices (NMDs) 
The medical sector also uses the IoT for connecting medical devices. When 
someone's pacemaker or insulin pump is connected through wireless connectivity, 
the patient's health is monitored for improved medical care. Personal data is 
transmitted from and to the device. The broad medical sector and the population 
became publicly alerted to this potential risk when US vice-president Dick Cheney 
revealed in 2013 his fear that his pacemaker could be hacked because of its wireless 
functionality4. US FDA recognises that cyber security threats to medical devices are a 
growing concern and that the exploitation of cyber security vulnerabilities presents a 
potential risk to the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. FDA recommends 
that manufacturers incorporate controls in the design of their new products to help 
prevent these risks, but also that they consider improvements throughout the entire 
lifecycle of a device. “All medical devices that use software and are connected to 
hospital and health care organisations’ networks have vulnerabilities—some we can 
proactively protect against, while others require vigilant monitoring and timely 
remediation”.5 
Neither the conventional automotive industry (i.e. excluding new entrants in the sector such 
as Google or Tesla that have a different approach to the marketing of autonomous driving) 
nor the medical sector have established routine risk management frameworks that include 
both traditional safety aspects and cyber security aspects. Many IT specialists and risk 
managers are not used to dealing with risks from adversaries, with deliberate attention to 
cause harm, who exploit weak entry points as vulnerabilities to enter in the system, and seek 
money, data or power. Information security risk (particularly intentional threats) is a 
relatively new field for service providers, manufacturers and regulators, embedded in the 
new role of chief information security officers (CISOs).  
• Road and car safety regulators are not familiar with cyber security issues and it is not 
clear how conventional regulators like UNECE or NHTSA will address these risks in 
their regulations.  
• The medical sector and biomedical technicians in hospitals do not routinely include in 
their risk management frameworks risks involved in the use of NMD, which are 
primarily handled by IT specialists or chief digital officers (DGOs). 
The term cyber security risk is used to describe a large variety of context-specific adversarial 
challenges. Overall, it entails the safeguarding of computer networks and the information 
they contain from penetration and from malicious damage or disruption. In this workshop, 
we may also include risks that derive from unintentional important failures or deficiencies 
in the connectivity function, as they would result from inappropriate security design. 
Device or data security, and the lack of clarity of purpose or understanding of the benefits of 
the IoT are often cited as causes for concern.6 We need to worry about how the IoT connects 
devices, using mainstream computer platforms, PCs, tablets, smartphones, and software 
that are susceptible to unintentional failures, as well as malware and intentional hacking. 
Software needs to be properly designed, configured and regularly updated or patched to 
protect data. On their side, consumers are required to observe good cyber security 
"hygiene" to prevent cyber security risk from materialising. 
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Attacks on the IoT and its associated infrastructure are potentially very serious7. There is 
some speculation as to the severity and scope of such threats, and to what extent privacy or 
life can be threatened. However, if not addressed early and comprehensively, cyber security 
risk may hinder trust in specific applications of the IoT, such as those that can be life critical 
or threatening8.  
This paper introduces discussions about cyber security aspects of the IoT, in critical sectors 
where individual lives could be put at risk if the IoT is dysfunctional. Questions include: 
• The IoT develops new opportunities through technological development, but what 
are the risks that come with this?  
• What are we protecting and for what purpose?  
• Is there a way to connect all those "things" without creating new risks that are not 
manageable? 
• To what extent can new technologies and IT science help mitigate the risks? 
• Can we make better use of existing standards, controls, and solutions? 
• Are general rules needed? New or revised regulations and standards?  
 
More regulation may impose content controls, diminish intellectual property rights, or make 
other requirements that could hinder innovation. If regulation is needed, it should be after a 
careful and evidence-based risk assessment that evaluates and balances the benefits and the 
risks from network connectivity, and a review of current and anticipated technical ways to 
manage the risks. 
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1. How does science, research and technology help deal with cyber 
security issues and other potential failures in connectivity, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability? 
 
Protecting data in the IoT requires securing the hardware itself (and having the right checks 
in place from the design stage) as well as the software (and the ability to maintain and 
upgrade it).9  
In general, the following principles can be recommended: 
• Security by design and by default. It is very important to consider security right from 
the start when a new product is designed and not as on top of an existing product. 
Devices connected to the IoT must be protected to be made intrinsically secure from 
the ground up, and the default configuration settings should be the most secure 
settings possible. However, security should be thought of as a process rather than an 
end-product.  
• Privacy by design and by default. Each service or business process that makes use of 
personal data must take the protection of such data into consideration. It is very 
important to consider data protection and privacy right from the start when a new 
product is designed. The strictest privacy settings should automatically apply. Privacy 
is safeguarded by law and regulation as well as by technology. However, privacy 
should be thought of as a process rather than an end-product only. 
• Need to know principle (principle of least privilege). Access to the information may 
be restricted to what is strictly necessary. Each connected entity can only 
communicate to the IoT the data that is absolutely necessary for its application. 
Allocating access rights is equally important. 
• Testing. Connection testing and integration of devices (hardware) and software are a 
major issue for medical devices, before being deployed in the market. But testing 
techniques only cover very specific types of weaknesses. Penetration testing is 
needed to assess the real-world security of a system from the viewpoint of an 
attacker, by discovering the vulnerabilities and by actively trying to exploit them 
(assessing security controls). 
• Maintenance. IoT devices have to be able to receive security updates throughout 
their whole lifespan to fix vulnerabilities discovered by manufacturers or third 
parties. Manufacturers should furthermore follow best practices in security which 
include actively engaging in discovery of said security vulnerabilities. 
 
Cryptography is one of the core technologies routinely used to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and authenticity in digital (communications) systems. However, in addition to 
following cryptography best practices, there are other important technologies that should 
also be considered to secure the IoT, including: 
• Secure decentralised systems. Topics here include private and anonymous 
communication technologies, Internet architecture, and secure operating 
systems.10 11 
• Robust and transparent software update mechanisms. As has been shown countless 
times in the past, software update mechanisms are often one of the most security-
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critical components in software-dependent systems and therefore very lucrative and 
frequently attacked targets. Novel techniques promise to help to defend against, or 
at least help unveiling, backdoored or otherwise malicious updates. 12 
• New approaches to privacy and data protection. There is ongoing research to lay the 
foundations and develop mechanisms to protect privacy and security in tomorrow's 
hyper-connected world, with an emphasis on mobile/wireless network.13 Other work 
includes protection against fingerprinting of traffic between devices. 14  
• Smart contracts, distributing trust with blockchains to redefine cyber security and 
defend the IoT.15 16 17   
• Verified software. There are a few examples of non-trivial software systems that 
have been fully verified (proven correct).18 These systems can eliminate quite many 
potential attacks and other software faults, which is or should be a requirement for 
building a safety-critical system. 
• Avionics software. Airplanes rely on high-quality software. The vendors have very 
strict processes and have to be certified at a very high level. Critical IoT systems 
would be advised to look at the way software is done in avionics, and use it as a 
starting point. 
 
Questions for discussion: 
 
• What will future IoT technology look like? 
• How can IoT-devices be designed, deployed, and maintained in ways that satisfy 
current security standards? 
• What are the main areas of research in computer science and specific IT 
instruments currently in development for securing the IoT? 
• Are manufacturers and IoT operators familiar with these instruments? Do they use 
them? 
• Are manufacturers and tech companies embracing “Security by Design (SbD)” and 
“Privacy by Design (PbD)” as part of their product development lifecycle and 
Quality approach? 
• To what extent are cyber security issues different for open source vs. proprietary 
software? 
• What are the limiting factors, e.g. power, processing, and storage capacity? 
• Could there be a ‘code of conduct’ for manufacturers of IoT devices? For medical 
devices? For autonomous vehicles? What should it include?  
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2. Connected vehicles (CVs) 
 
The security challenges involved in the development of connected vehicles (which is 
instrumental to the success of autonomous vehicles) is closely linked to that of the entire IoT 
environment. Current automotive platforms do not have default security features as applied 
in other sectors such as the IT industry and the banking sector. However, the automotive 
sector must include security and privacy protection in today’s automotive components, 
systems and platforms where different communication paradigms are embedded in19. An 
acceptable level of performance and reliability in security, safety, privacy-protection for fully 
connected vehicles will be required before users trust them and regulators authorise them.  
 
The vulnerability of connected cars has been demonstrated in numerous cases.20 Malicious 
actors can exploit vulnerabilities ranging from unauthorised entry to commandeering the 
vehicle’s operation. The opportunities for compromise will increase together with consumer 
demand for more features, some for convenience and comfort only. 
 
Risk of manipulation, intrusion or cyber threats in general are due to: 
• Complexity, which makes securing systems very difficult. For example: there are 
approximately 100 million lines of codes in a vehicle; vehicles must communicate 
with many networks, via many Engine Control Units (ECUs), which have to 
communicate with them; and in-vehicle systems are highly heterogeneous, with 
some for critical functions, and others for leisure or convenience. 
• Connectivity, with the development of wireless communication interfaces and 
networks. These interfaces serve to connect the vehicle to the IoT and extend 
functionality, but also make the vehicle more exposed, accessible and attractive to 
cyber attacks. 
Figure 2: Connected cars.  
Courtesy from CAN connected. Available on http://www.slideshare.net/spukale/connected-cars-iotmum-org 
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• The value of the content information that can be stolen: personal information such 
as identity or data. 
 
With a growing number of connected vehicles on the roads, their value to attackers and 
subsequent potential gain will increase. What is unclear is what will be the (main) 
motivations for hackers and the vectors of attacks. Security experts have produced 
comprehensive analyses of attack surface, type of hacks and specific threats that they pose, 
and anatomy of attacks.21 Bluetooth, for instance, is considered to be one of the biggest 
attack surfaces, due to the complexity of the protocol and underlying data. 
 
The potential threats that may be of highest concern include22: 
• Unauthorised physical access to vehicles; deliberate manipulation of a vehicle's 
operation: door unlocking, remote start, acceleration, steering, braking. 
• Theft of personally identifiable information from manufacturer or third-party storage 
systems 
• Extortion enabled by ransomware that renders vehicles inoperable until a ransom is 
paid. 
The risk of ransomware has so far affected ordinary individuals, hospitals, and other 
institutions. Vehicle’s increased connectivity, ever-expanding attack surface, and high 
upfront cost make them attractive ransomware targets. Also, vehicles are more likely 
susceptible to ransomware attacks when their disablement can cause knock-on 
effects. 
• Hijacking vehicle systems to enable malicious cyber activity: if vehicular systems 
are/would be used as command and control infrastructure for illicit cyber activity.  
• Connectedness dependency, both to the vehicle’s function and the social 
implications. 
 
Cyber security risk in Intelligent Public Transport 
 
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is an EU agency 
that works with EU member states, as the centre of expertise for cyber security in Europe. 
In 2015 it published the results of a survey about threats, risks, challenges and gaps facing 
cyber security within Intelligent Public Transport (IPT) 23 
Challenges: 
1. Difficulty to integrate security for safety 
2. Inadequate importance and spending being afforded to cyber security 
3. Inadequate checking for countermeasures 
4. Unwillingness to collaborate and exchange information on cyber security 
5. Slow phasing out of legacy systems 
6. Inadequate data exchange between IPT and smart cities operators 
7. Weak situational awareness of cyber threats 
8. Resistance to security adoption 
After summarising existing technical, policy, standards, organisational and human good 
practices, the report provides a gap analysis: 
1. Lack of a common EU approach to IPT security 
2. No integration of security in current EU guidelines for IPT 
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3. Lack of common definitions and formalised cyber security policies 
4. Lack of corporate governance of IPT security 
5. No specific security standards for IPT 
6. Lack of advanced interdependent analysis tools 
7. Lack of advanced risk assessment tools 
8. Lack of advanced real-time and multi-stakeholder-enabled security technologies 
Recommendations include: 
Institutions and  decision makers should: 
• Promote public/private collaboration on IPT cyber security 
• Promote and facilitate the development of a common EU approach to IPT security 
• Develop a comprehensive EU strategy and framework for cyber security in IPT 
• Integrate and converge security efforts made in other sectors of activity 
• Foster the development of harmonised cyber security standards for IPT 
Transport operators should: 
• Integrate cyber security in their corporate governance 
• Develop and implement an integrated corporate strategy addressing holistically 
cyber security and safety risks 
• Implement risk management for cyber security in multi-stakeholder environments 
including external contractors and dependencies 
• Clearly and routinely specify their cyber security requirements 
• Annually review organisational cyber security processes, practices and 
infrastructures 
Manufacturers and solution providers should: 
• Create products / solutions that match the cyber security requirements of IPT end-
users 
• Collaborate in the development of IPT-specific standards and apply them to IPT 
solutions 
• Develop a trusted information sharing platform on risks and vulnerabilities 
• Provide security guidance for systems, products and solutions 
Box 1: ENISA Cyber Security and Resilience of Intelligent Transport Systems 
 
Cyber security is a new challenge and a new field for car manufacturers 
The cyber security of connected vehicles is among the major challenges that car 
manufacturers and others in the supply chain are facing, primarily because this is new to 
them. The mitigation of cyber security is a new field of research, testing and 
implementation.b  
The field of automotive cyber security is emerging. It is different from the field of 
automotive safety, because safety is probabilistic. The individual risk of accident can be 
calculated and kept within acceptable boundaries aligned to a set of protective measures. 
The residual risk can be transferred to insurance. In contrast, cyber risk can hardly be 
calculated because of the malicious nature of hackers, who cause intentional and accidental 
                                                     
b Other challenges (which the workshop will not discuss) include the technology of sensors, radars, cameras 
and LIDARs that enable to a car to sense its environment, and with data fusion that enables the car ECU to 
interpret the data and make decisions. 
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harm. More research is needed about the cyber security of connected cars, to assess and 
characterise the risk, and develop methods for predicting it, preventing it and reducing its 
negatives consequences. A particular difficulty is that this must be done throughout the 
lifetime of the vehicle, which requires maintenance and updates, both physical and over-the-
air. 
Successful remote and safety-critical attacks on vehicles are not only "cyber". They are 
"cyber-physical" attacks. They require that attackers can have a remote access to an internal 
automotive network, that they are able to communicate with the network by sending 
messages to the vehicle's internal communication bus, to control the target ECU, and that 
they can instruct the ECU to take control of the physical parts of the vehicle, by interacting 
with other ECUs, such as those for braking, steering or accelerating.  
Like for any cyber-physical system, it is difficult to determine ex-ante whether a car is safe. 
First, one must examine how it behaves in many different circumstances, user contexts and 
driving styles. Testing safety features and behaviour is an activity that car manufacturers are 
familiar with, but assessing the absence of insecure behaviour, or the lack of vulnerability, is 
much harder. Vehicles are made to be safe. This is an intention. But whether an autonomous 
car behaves safely is different. Hackers do not look at the beauty of the systems 
architecture, but at the bugs and weak points of entry. Program testers look at the presence 
of bugs, not their absence. 
Suggestions for building cyber security in connected vehicles, and end-to-end security and 
privacy will probably be based on the following principles24: 
• Security and privacy frameworks, implementation on the basis of security and privacy 
by default 
• (Open) platform principles and architectures that utilise trust components and 
trusted intra- and extra-vehicular networks, the seamless cooperation of different 
communication paradigms and high data-rate sensor-networking 
• Trusted cloud services for diagnostic, prognostics, monitoring and upgrading 
• Safety, comfort and cooperative mobility services, which also maintain privacy 
• Good practices, policies and standards, organisational processes (see suggestions 
provided by ENISA in "Cyber Security and Resilience of Intelligent Public Transport 
Systems" in Box 1 and forthcoming publication on securing smart cars).25 
 
Standards 
 
There are numerous complementary and perhaps overlapping international standards that 
address car safety, security and connectivity. The proliferation of standards is a sign that 
industry is aware and working to improve the situation, but some simplification or 
harmonisation may be needed, especially to address issues of interoperability. Among the 
ISO working groups and standards that are relevant to cyber security issues: 
• ISO TC 22 road vehicles / SC 32 Electronical and electronic components and general 
systems aspects and ISO 26262 deal with in-vehicle transport information and control 
systems. 
  Not for circulation 
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• ISO TC 204 Intelligent Transport Systems is responsible for the overall system aspects 
and infrastructure aspects of intelligent transport systems (ITS), as well as the 
coordination of the overall ISO work programme in this field including the schedule for 
standards development, taking into account the work of existing international 
standardisation bodies. 
ISO 15638 "Intelligent transport systems" provides a framework for cooperative 
telematics applications for regulated vehicles26, and the basis for future development of 
cooperative telematics applications for regulated commercial freight vehicles, allowing 
for a platform for highly cost-effective delivery of a range of telematics applications. It 
provides a business architecture based on a (multiple) service provider-oriented 
approaches, and addresses legal and regulatory aspects for the approval and auditing of 
service providers.  
• Other standards may apply, although not specific to the automotive industry. For 
example, software for mobile phones used to connect a car to the Internet. 
 
Insurance and liability considerations 
 
• What is the situation with regards to how the consequences / costs of cyber security 
risk are covered by insurance?  
• In the case of a cyber security breach involving a connected car, what is covered, and 
by whom or which or whose insurance?  
• Are specific insurance products for that already available or being developed? What 
is different in the US and in Europe? 
• What is the insurance situation if an automated braking (or steering) system is 
manipulated as a result of a cyber security breach, and this causes an accident?  
• If the breach lets the hacker have access to data that is protected by law who is 
responsible? 
Generating trust in connected cars  
Beyond technical security, it is the generation of public confidence that will ultimately 
determine whether connected vehicles are viewed as secure by their users. People want to 
trust the secure systems developed for these vehicles, as it is these systems that will ensure 
that their car is safe and their private data well protected. However, since perfect safety is 
not achievable, users' decisions (to buy or use an autonomous car, to turn features on or off) 
will be based on their own perception, appreciation and trade-offs between two relative 
perceptions of safety or security, balancing convenience, utility, safety and security. The 
user's configurable interface in itself can cause significant problems with many configuration 
combinations which adds to the complexity of testing. One issue here is that the software 
and security measures are likely to be proprietary to the manufacturers and therefore users 
will be limited to marketing hype when making decisions on safety. 
 
In the context of governance, two initiatives are worth mentioning here: 
 
• The US-based grassroots organisation "I am the Cavalry" urges carmakers to 
acknowledge that vehicle safety issues can be caused by cyber security issues, and 
embraces security researchers as willing allies to preserve safety. It proposes five 
foundational capabilities to improve the visibility of car safety programmes: safety by 
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design, third party collaboration, evidence capture, security updates, and 
segmentation and isolation.c 
• The European Commission DG Move C-ITS platform to promote Intelligent Transport 
Systems in Europe delivered its final report in January 2016. C-ITS addressed the 
main technical and legal issues (such as liability, data protection and privacy), and 
provided policy recommendations and proposals for action.d  
 
Questions for discussion: 
 
• To what extent are current vehicles at risk of being hacked? Are the existing 
vulnerabilities being exploited? How much do we know in reality?  
• To what extent can the risk impact the safety of car drivers, passengers and other 
road users? 
• What available cyber security solutions exist today? 
• Where is short- medium- or long-term research needed? 
• In the case of an accident or incident, what is the ability for self-correction or 
resilience? 
• What is the perception of the drivers / users? Is there too much hype? Or not 
enough attention? 
• Where is there a need for more or different standards and regulation? 
• How to build and implement a comprehensive cyber security strategy?  
• Is there a risk that too much attention on risk hinders innovation? 
• What is the role of insurers? What are they concerned about? What solutions do 
they consider? 
• Is there a problem of trust? 
  
                                                     
c https://www.iamthecavalry.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Five-Star-Automotive-Cyber-Safety-February-
2015.pdf  
d http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/its/doc/c-its-platform-final-report-january-
2016.pdf  
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3. Implantable, wearable, networked medical and health devices 
(NMDs) 
 
 
 
 
Wireless interfaces and computer software systems have now become routinely used in 
modern medical devices. Implantable medical devices (IMDs), including insulin and other 
drug infusion pumps, neurostimulators, pacemakers or cardiac defibrillators, feature 
wireless connectivity for the remote control and monitoring of patients’ vital signs, to 
improve the ability of healthcare care providers to deliver timely treatment. Patients lead 
more normal and healthy lives. Wearable devices for healthy lifestyle monitoring can also be 
used as vulnerable entry points to healthcare or other critical systems. 
Vulnerabilities of networked medical devices 
Interconnectivity makes medical devices vulnerable to security breaches, in the same way as 
most networked computing systems are vulnerable. We ought to be concerned that the 
connectivity of medical devices has the potential to directly affect clinical care, patient 
safety, and the protection of patients' private data. Medical devices are no longer isolated. 
Their connection to a network raises tensions between safety and security which will require 
both technical mitigation strategies and a revision of current governance arrangement 
between stakeholders.27 Similarly, there is concern regarding the vulnerability that the 
devices themselves create to a hospital or other medical IT network by their presence on it.  
Internet security experts have been warning for years that implantable medical devices such 
as pacemakers are open to data theft and remote control by a hacker. According to an 
article published in January 2015 in Science28 "Medical devices such as insulin pumps, 
continuous glucose monitors, and pacemakers or defibrillators have become increasingly 
small and wearable in recent years. They often connect with a hand-held controller over 
Figure 4: Wireless implantable medical devices.  
MIT CSAIL. Courtesy of / available from 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/ 
Figure 3: Wearable health devices.  
Cisco. Courtesy of / available from 
http://blogs.cisco.com/digital/the-future-of-mobility-
wearables-healthcare 
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short distances using Bluetooth. Often, either the controller or the device itself is connected 
to the Internet by means of Wi-Fi so that data can be sent directly to clinicians. But security 
experts have demonstrated that with easily available hardware, a user manual, and the 
device's PIN number, they can take control of a device or monitor the data it sends." 
The Computer Science Department at the University of Massachusetts, the CSAIL group at 
MIT29 and others have shown that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the 
confidentiality of the data transmitted by the device or to send to the device unauthorised 
commands, some with the potential to be life threatening. Recent hacks or threats continue 
to raise concerns.30 
Innovation in the field derives from progress in medicine, computer engineering and science, 
and other sciences. But medical device software is not always trustworthy, leading to 
shortfalls in properties such as safety, effectiveness, dependability, reliability, usability, 
security, and privacy. This is caused by the increasing complexity and a lack of attention to 
security aspects in the early development of medical devices, due to the costs and older 
architectures, together with the long development processes and approval/certification for 
medical devices These become vulnerable and can be compromised, their behaviour can 
become unpredictable or manipulated.31 Wireless connectivity is thus convenient, but raises 
the risk of malicious access to an IMD that can potentially infringe patients' privacy and even 
endanger their life.32 The secondary impact on patient safety means that we need to 
consider what we are protecting against in the context of use both inside and outside the 
network.  
Vulnerabilities include possible breaches in: 
• Confidentiality, which can be compromised when poor access control measures leads 
to unauthorised access 
• Integrity, which can be affected by data corruption or unauthorised manipulation of 
data, possibly impacting the patient safety. This can result from either unintentional 
failure (when incorrect clinical decision is taken based on corrupted data) or 
intentional attack (when an attacker remotely operates the device) 
• Availability, which causes loss of data from or to the device. Disruption in accession 
important or critical data can affect the functioning of the device and clinical 
decisions. If alerts are not received, the patient life may be at risk. 
These vulnerabilities increase: 
• With legacy devices, operating systems and software. In particular, older devices run 
proprietary operating systems, that are not recognised by standard cyber security 
vulnerability detection products 
• When software is not updated or patched 
• When unprotected web services are used to interface with the network 
• If compromised medical devices are used to enter in a health care network, where 
further damage will be caused 
• In general, when there is a lack of awareness or a lack of concern (by professionals 
and the public) and poor security practices. 
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Motivations of attackers include a range of reasons, similar to other IoT applications33. 
Those considered as of utmost concerns are: 
• Financial gain (ransomware) 
• State-sponsored espionage (primarily to obtain access to confidential information) 
• Cyber terrorism or hacktivism (to make a political statement) 
Attackers can be individuals both inside and outside the organisation. This includes 
disaffected insiders with legitimate access.   
Technical aspects: what could be done, specific challenges of securing connectivity of 
NMDs 
Embedding cyber security solutions is complicated because of: 
• Legacy: millions of people already have wireless IMDs in the US, which can last up to 
10 years. Replacing an IMD requires surgery. Incorporating cryptographic 
mechanisms into existing IMDs may be infeasible because of limited device memory 
and power, and the need to recall hundreds of thousands of insecure devices. 
Consideration must be given to the risk to an individual patient balanced with the 
clinical risk on not using a device.  
• Accessibility: need to have immediate access in the case of an emergency. Health 
care professionals must have immediate access to an implanted device. If 
cryptographic methods are embedded in the IMD itself, the device shall deny 
unauthorised access. Sharing credentials within a network of hospitals, if the patient 
is unconscious, or if the cryptographic key storage is damaged or unreachable will 
result in the weakening of the protection that the cryptographic method provides.  
• Maintainability: software failure and bugs are frequent. For medical devices, they 
may require device recalls, which are costly. In addition, the problem is exacerbated 
by the logistics of managing software testing and updates in a hospital environment 
where the number of devices can be in the thousands, of which most will be in use. 
How can NMDs be protected? 
• Obvious approaches, such as passwords and certificates are not workable at large 
scale, given the lack of central authority and frequent emergencies. IMDs are 
constrained in their power consumption and computational capabilities. A trade-off 
must be made between security and utility.34  
• Among other research groups, the Archimedes Ann Harbour Research Center for 
Medical Device Security based at the University of Michigan35 produces 
multidisciplinary research focused on improving the cyber security of medical 
devices. Much of the research pertains to low-power and trustworthy computing for 
medical devices. Archimedes focuses on a protection of IMDs based on security 
mechanisms that are entirely on an external device. This approach enhances the 
security of IMDs for patients who already have them. It also empowers medical 
personnel to access a protected IMD by removing the external device or powering it 
off, and does not in itself increase the risk of IMD recalls. 
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• NMDs cannot be considered in isolation of the networks in which they are deployed. 
Given the gravity of the impact of adverse events on patient safety, comprehensive, 
integrated and well maintained organisational network security is essential.  
Standards and certification 
There are numerous international standards, including those of the technical committee (TC) 
215 (health informatics): ISO/IEC 62304 (medical device software, ISO/IEC 82304 (health 
software), and ISO/IEC 80001 (Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating 
medical device); and those of TC 210 (quality management for medical devices): 
ISO/ANSI/AAMI 14971 (for the application of risk management to medical devices), or ISO 
80002 (medical device software). But there seems a lack of focus on the specificity required 
for cyber security. These standards provide good practice in software development and 
lifecycle, but do not provide the much-needed guidance for cyber security protection of 
networked medical devices. Currently, ISO/ANSI/AAMI/IEC 80001 is under redevelopment 
and will include consideration of cyber security, in addition to the specific ISO/IEC 80001-2-9 
which specifies cyber security controls.   
Recognising the lack of guidance for conducting cyber security risk assessment of medical 
devices, the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) published 
in June 2016 its "Principles for medical device security – risk management" that "provides 
guidance on methods to perform information security risk management for a medical device 
in the context of the Safety Risk Management process required by ISO 14971". The principles 
incorporate the expanded view of risk management from IEC 80001-1 by incorporating the 
key properties of safety, effectiveness, data security and systems security. It proposes 
recommendations to medical device manufacturers for managing "risks from security 
threats that could impact the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of the device or 
the information processed by the device".36 
In April 2016, Underwriters Laboratories (UL) launched a Cybersecurity Assurance Program. 
The new UL 2900 series of standards offers to vendors testable cyber security criteria for 
network-connectable products and systems, to assess software vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses, minimise exploitation, address known malware, review security controls and 
increase security awareness. UK 2900-2 provides particular requirements for networked 
connectable components of healthcare systems.37 
Regarding certification, the question will be to what extent certification provides necessary 
confidence in cyber security protection. Security is an emergent property of a system, so the 
security of a device must be considered in the broad context of the system of which it is a 
part, that is, its operating environment. No manufacturer will be able to ensure aspects of 
the operating environment that are outside of its control. Security can only result from a 
collaboration between manufacturers and health care organisations, taking into 
consideration technical, organisational and human factor aspects. 
Regulation 
The medical sector is heavily regulated... But this may turn against cyber security. One of the 
reasons for which medical devices do not get regular security updates, like smartphones and 
computers, is because changes to their software could require recertification by regulators 
  Not for circulation 
 22 
like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  The FDA focuses on reliability, user safety, 
and ease of use. Until recently, it was not overly  concerned with protection against 
malicious attacks. However, European regulators seem to be even less concerned than their 
US counterparts. See Boxes 2 and 3 below. 
US FDA concerns, approach, initiatives and recommendations concerning cyber security 
matters since 2013 
 
In a Safety Communication issued in 2013, the agency said that it "[we] are not aware of 
any patient injuries or deaths associated with these cyber-related) incidents nor do we 
have any indication that any specific devices or systems in clinical use have been purposely 
targeted at this time.” However, FDA was adding that it “expects medical device 
manufacturers to take appropriate steps” to protect devices. Manufacturers then began to 
employ security experts to tighten up their systems. But observers noted that unless such 
steps become compulsory, it would take a fatal attack on a prominent person for the 
security gap to be closed.38 
In October 2014, FDA issued its pre-market cyber security guidance.39 Key principles are: 
- Shared responsibility between stakeholders, including health care facilities, patients, 
providers, and manufacturers of medical devices  
- Address cyber security during the design and development of the medical device  
- Establish design inputs for device related to cyber security, and establish a cyber security 
vulnerability and management approach as part of the required software validation and 
risk analysis. 
An assessment conducted in October 2015 indicated that, among those submissions that 
should have included cyber security information, 53% did not provide it. 
In July 2015, FDA issued its first safety communication40 : "The FDA is alerting users of the 
Hospira Symbiq Infusion System to cybersecurity vulnerabilities with this infusion pump. 
We strongly encourage that healthcare facilities transition to alternative infusion systems, 
and discontinue use of these pumps." FDA experts had assessed that the Symbiq Infusion 
System could be accessed remotely through a hospital’s network, thus allowing an 
unauthorised user to control the device and change the dosage that the pump delivers, 
which could lead to over- or under-infusion of critical patient therapies. Recommendation 
to patients and health care facilities were to disconnect the pump from the network. 
However, warnings also included that disconnecting the device would require drug 
libraries to be updated manually, which could be prone to entry error. 
On 15 January 2016, as part of the FDA’s ongoing efforts to ensure the safety and 
effectiveness of medical devices, at all stages of their lifecycle in the face of potential 
cyber threats, FDA strengthened its cyber security recommendations for medical device 
manufacturers, issuing draft guidance to address post-market management of cyber 
security vulnerabilities. The draft guidance outlines important steps that medical device 
manufacturers should take to continually address cyber security risks to keep patients safe 
and better protect the public health. The draft guidance details the agency’s 
recommendations for monitoring, identifying and addressing cyber security vulnerabilities 
in medical devices once they have entered the market. The draft guidance also addresses 
the importance of information sharing via participation in an Information Sharing Analysis 
Organization (ISAO), a collaborative group in which public and private-sector members 
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share cyber security information. The draft guidance recommends that manufacturers 
should implement a structured and systematic comprehensive cyber security risk 
management program and respond in a timely fashion to identified vulnerabilities.41 The 
draft post-market guidance was released on 22 January 2016.42 
On 20-21 January  2016, FDA organised a public workshop in collaboration with the 
National Health Information Sharing Analysis Center (NH-ISAC), the Department of Health 
and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security. The title was "Moving 
Forward: Collaborative Approaches to Medical Device Cybersecurity." The workshop 
brought together diverse stakeholders to discuss complex challenges in medical device 
cyber security that impact the medical device ecosystem. Its purpose was to highlight past 
collaborative efforts, increase awareness of existing maturity models (i.e. frameworks 
leveraged for benchmarking an organization’s processes) which are used to evaluate cyber 
security status, standards, and tools in development, and to engage the multi-stakeholder 
community in focused discussions on unresolved gaps and challenges that have hampered 
progress in advancing medical device cyber security.43  
Box 2: US FDA guidance (medical devices) 
European initiatives 
 
The EU regulatory framework for medical devices differs from that used for 
pharmaceutical drug development.  
Under the existing regulation, medical devices are not subject to any pre-market 
authorisation by a regulatory authority44 but to a conformity assessment which, for 
medium- and high-risk devices, involves an independent third party, known as ‘notified 
body’. 45 Notified bodies, of which there are around 80 across Europe, are designated and 
monitored by the Member States and act under the control of the national authorities. 
Once certified, devices bear the CE marking which allows them to circulate freely in the 
EU/EFTA countries and Turkey. 
European medical device regulations are under revision. The current proposal for a 
Regulation on medical devices (COM/2012/0542 final - 2012/0266 46(COD) aims to 
overcome flaws and gaps in the existing regulation and to strengthen patient safety 
further. The proposal says that a robust, transparent and sustainable regulatory 
framework should be put in place that is ‘fit for purpose’. This framework should be 
supportive of innovation and the competitiveness of the medical device industry and 
should allow rapid and cost-efficient market access for innovative medical devices, to the 
benefit of patients and healthcare professionals.47 The proposal does not address 
specifically issues related to cyber security and the IoT. 
However, the regulation of networked medical devices will also be affected by the new 
Regulation (2016/679) and Directive (2016/680) on Data Protection. 48 
In the course of the revision of the Data Protection Directive, the "Article 29 Data 
Protection Working party", an independent European advisory body on data protection 
and privacy, adopted in September 2014  a specific  "Opinion" (8/2014) on the "recent 
developments on the Internet of Things"  upon  the  consideration that  IoT  poses  a  
number  of significant  privacy  and  data  protection  challenges,  some  new,  some  more  
traditional,  but  then  amplified  with  regard  to  the  exponential  increase  of  data  
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processing  involved  in  its  evolution.  Section 2 of the Opinion mentions in particular 
concerns about the lack of control and information asymmetry, the quality of the user's 
consent, inferences derived from data and repurposing of original processing, and security 
risks: security vs. efficiency (2.6).49 
The regulation of networked medical devices will also be affected by the new Directive on 
Information Security (NIS). 50 Among other requirements, NIS establishes an incident 
reporting scheme that requires from critical infrastructure, including health care 
providers, the reporting of information security incidents. The scheme is organised by 
ENISA, which launched in July 2016 a study on cloud and eHealth, targeted at CIOs, CISOs, 
doctors, patients, healthcare providers and manufacturers, cloud providers, and public 
authorities that are involved within the healthcare sector.51 
ENISA 
 
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is an EU agency 
that works with EU member states, as the centre of expertise for cyber security in Europe.  
Considering mobile health (mHealth), ENISA recognises52 that it "is a rapidly developing 
sub-segment of eHealth that covers medical and public health practice supported by 
mobile devices. [...]. It comprises a set of technologies which will bring a more innovative 
care access reducing healthcare costs at the same time. More specifically, mHealth 
includes the use of mobile communication devices for health and well-being services and 
information purposes as well as mobile health applications. The European Commission, 
having recognised the emergent role of mHealth in the transformation of healthcare, 
published in April 2014 a Green Paper on mHealth that considers existing barriers and 
issues related to mHealth deployment and analyses mHealth potential to maintain and 
improve patients' health and well-being and encourage their empowerment. (...)  
At the same time, according to the EC Directive on Critical Infrastructures, healthcare 
services have been recognised as a critical societal sector and therefore, healthcare 
systems are considered as critical infrastructures that should be protected by all types of 
threats, including cyber security attacks. Moreover, in the proposed NIS Directive, 
healthcare is considered as one of the critical sectors vital for the society" (...) 
"Healthcare systems are becoming vulnerable to cyber security incidents due to various 
reasons; the volume of information and the connection with patients dictates the use of 
automation and IT; the diverse nature of healthcare information systems enables different 
devices to access the Internet (even though not designed for this) thus making them easy 
targets; many outdated applications and systems didn’t include security as a priority 
requiring close attention of the information security officers and finally the exponentially 
increasing attack surface is making systems compromise an easier task. Combining these 
reasons with the fact that a breach of security can impact large parts of the population16 
makes eHealth a critical sector." 
Box 3: European regulation and initiatives (medical devices) 
It should be noted that while the FDA (Box 2) cites a lack of attack evidence, this may reflect 
a lack of recognition or reporting of cyber security breaches by affected organisations. 
Further, one aspect of concern is that the pre-market submissions are based on self-
assessment and do not (and potentially cannot) include a comprehensive assessment of 
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potential issues once connected to a network of deployment. The reality is that an insecure 
device may be more clinically useful than no device at all.  
Insurance and liability issues 
• What is the situation with regards to how the consequences / costs of cyber security 
risk are covered by insurance?  
• In the case of a cyber security breach involving a connected wearable/implanted 
medical device, what is covered, and by whom or which or whose insurance?  
• Are there already or in development specific insurance products for that? 
• If a connected pacemaker is hacked, and this causes an adverse health outcome to a 
patient, who is responsible and what kind of insurance coverage is available?  
• It a connected pacemaker is hacked and is used to enter into a health care provider 
systems whose data is compromised, what is the insurance situation? Who is 
responsible? 
At the governance level, potential solutions include:  
• Incident reporting and feedback between health care providers and MD 
manufacturers, to improve risk mitigation 
• Developing a risk-based approach to safety and security: risk identification, risk 
management, incident response53 
• Regulation from licensing authorities (regulatory compliance for patient safety) and 
payer agencies (rules for reimbursement of medical therapies that involved NMD), to 
determine basic safety and security requirements 
• New, revised or harmonised standards for NMDs 
• Review by insurance companies of what they insure and how, in the case of an 
incident. 
A complex issue: multidisciplinary and collaborative approaches are needed 
Cyber security vulnerabilities in medical devices develop in a complex environment. It is a 
multifaceted problem that requires a multidisciplinary perspective with the involvement of 
various stakeholders representing the public sectors (regulators, health agencies, public 
health care operators and public payers), the private sector (manufacturers of MD, private 
health care providers and insurance companies) and patients.54 
The cyber security of NMDs requires the consideration of privacy and security goals on the 
one hand, and health care utility and safety on the other hand. Existing NMDs do not have 
strong encryption and strict access control. Encryption requires a capacity for data 
processing and power, which are generally not available for existing NMDs. Applying 
solutions developed in other sectors may slow down the functioning of the devices and 
create new risk to patient safety, especially in the case of an emergency. In the field of 
health, it is safety that matters most, before cyber security requirements. Governance 
arrangements that could be developed should work to close the gap between safety and 
security. 
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The US-based grassroots organisation "I am the Cavalry" proposes a new Hippocratic Oath 
for Connected Medical Devices, as a symbolic attestation by physicians to the health care 
stakeholder communities, to provide care in the best interest of patients. The oath 
addresses cyber safety issues, software flaws and other negative side effects of advances in 
medical technology, delivered by connected medical devices. It recommends five principles: 
cyber safety by design, third-party collaboration, evidence capture, resilience and 
containment, and cyber safety updates.e 
 
Questions for discussion: 
 
• What is the definition of a “networked medical and health device”?  Is it just the 
device itself? Upstream and downstream devices? Manufacturer’s supporting 
infrastructure? Ecosystem? 
• To what extent are current networked medical devices at risk? Are the existing 
vulnerabilities being exploited? How much do we know in reality?  
• Is there a risk that too much attention on risk hinders innovation? 
• What are the motivations for hacking NMDs? 
• What is the perception of the patients? Is there too much hype? Or not enough 
attention? 
• How to build and implement a comprehensive cyber security strategy?  
• What are the available technologies? Are there available market solutions that are 
affordable in current business models?  
• Where is short- medium- or long-term research needed? 
• Where is there a need for more or different standards and regulation? 
• What is the role of insurers? What are they concerned about? What solutions do 
insurers consider? 
• Is there a problem of trust? 
• Is there any ability for resilience and self-correction?  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
e https://www.iamthecavalry.org/domains/medical/oath/  
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4. Collaboration among actors for cyber security risk governance: 
regulation, standards, interoperability, liability and insurance 
 
Moving on, from identifying vulnerabilities and reviewing current research to developing 
solutions for cyber risk: What are the main principles that legislation, standards and 
insurance apply or are advised to apply when they regulate, certify or insure products and 
services that rely on the connectivity between devices and between devices and 
infrastructure? What are the roles of various organisations to guarantee secure connections 
for a safe IoT? How can collaboration among actors be organised? 
• Role of policy makers, public regulators 
• Role of standard setting organisations, certification.  
• Role and responsibility (including liability) of various industry actors 
• Role of judicial systems and litigation 
• Role of affected stakeholders (e.g. road users and patients) 
• Role of the insurance industry  
Regulation 
Will institutions such as the European Medicine Agency (EMA) or US-FDA for medical 
devices, and UNECE or NHTSA for autonomous vehicles consider specific regulation to deal 
with cyber security risk? 
Standards, certification and interoperability 
The IoT utilises hardware and software from many different vendors. The ability of these 
devices and systems to work together is critical to realise the full value of IoT applications 
and avoid or reduce cyber security risks. Without interoperability, many of the potential 
benefits of the Internet of Things will not be realised. Good collaboration between 
stakeholders for the development of standards is needed and will enable technological 
innovation. It will define and establish common foundations upon which product 
differentiation, innovative technology development, and performance can be developed. 
International standards are probably needed, so that manufacturers do not incur the 
additional costs associated with creating different versions of the same product for different 
markets. 
Standards such as ISO standards in this field aim to support the commercial world with using 
modern and existing wireless communication technologies to enable more efficient use of 
commercial vehicles, medical devices and other IoT devices, safely and in controlled ways. 
An indication of the immaturity of the IoT might be the proliferation of standards and 
protocols related to the field. At the same time, it is often the case that different devices 
from different manufacturers that aspire to do the same things have radically different data 
formats and potentially different touch-points, thus making interoperability and connection 
between them difficult, if not impossible.55 
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Liability issues 
In the case of an accident resulting from negligence or breach in an IoT system, who is 
responsible and liable? The wide-spread adoption of technologies incurs changes in 
attribution of responsibility. This issue is already the topic of much discussion for 
autonomous cars, partly because the insurance system is concerned. In the case of an 
incident or accident due to a medical device being hacked, who is responsible? Are insurers 
concerned with this question? 
In the US in particular, liability regimes and courts have an important role in structuring legal 
issues and responsibilities of various stakeholders. The risk of potential litigation can create 
powerful incentives in favour of “self-regulation". Tort liability and the potential for lost 
business provide a very strong incentive for US companies to design safer products. 
Insurance considerations 
Insurance can play a key role in structuring a risk market and overall improving the safety 
and security of insured products. It acts on two levels: 
• Compensating losses in case of an accident 
• Risk evaluation: the insurance industry expertise to assess risk and put on a price tag 
can help manufacturers improve the security of their products  
Regarding cyber security risk, the question of its insurability is still uncertain, although a 
recent report indicates that risks "of daily life" could be insured with standard practices, 
whereas risks "from extreme scenarios" might require specific approaches, such as those for 
large natural disasters.56 
Conclusion: multi-stakeholder governance 
The negotiation of governance arrangements between stakeholders includes various 
components: 
• Clear public policies about anticipated benefits of the IoT, including in the 
transportation and medical sectors, and appropriate strategies 
• Technique: cyber security protection must be embedded in the early design and 
development of a product 
• Awareness and perception: it is important to understand that addressing cyber 
security issues is not meant to hinder innovation. Industry and regulators ought to be 
concerned by the risk, become familiar with it, and address it seriously. It is only by 
understanding the key vulnerabilities that they will support dedicated research and 
solution development. 
• Regulation and standards: much guidance is needed in this evolving, challenging and 
fundamental shift that is taking place in both the automotive and medical industries. 
• Responsibility and liability: as new cyber security risks are impacting the business, the 
legal system has to determine how litigation would affect the attribution of 
responsibility and liability 
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5. The IoT and the digital world, resilience strategies 
 
Creating trust in connectivity including confidentiality, integrity and availability will be key to 
achieving the promises of the IoT, at least in the automotive and medical sector. Assessing 
vulnerability, implementing and assessing security controls, designing appropriate standards 
and regulation as well as insurance and other governance arrangements will be critical 
elements. But the creation of trust may require that broader societal questions need to be 
addressed, including the following elements:   
• The IoT will blur the concept of privacy  
That may be acceptable for young people who voluntarily give access to their data, but is 
it also acceptable that the right to privacy is ignored when cyber security risk are 
evaluated as being more important?57 
• Systemic cyber risk 
Cyber security risks are systemic risks, with potential for cascading consequences in 
other systems. As illustrated by the World Economic Council in its recent report about 
Understanding Systemic Cyber Risk58, there are significant gaps in cyber security 
resiliency related to critical healthcare information and systems. Governments and 
industry struggle to deal with cyber risk, although they create the risk to a certain degree 
by being increasingly dependent on the technology and routinely behind attackers. 
Managing the systemic nature of cyber risk will be necessary to create trust in the IoT. 
• Accidents will happen. We need to develop resilience  
For complex systems that are potentially subject to unexpected failures (unexpected in 
the sense that prevention is not sufficient), it is commonly understood that resilience 
strategies must be developed. Resilience is defined by the US National Academy of 
Sciences (2012) as ‘‘(t)he ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more 
successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events”. Whereas risk management 
selects and prioritises potential protective measures to prevent or mitigate impacts to 
the status quo at a point in time, resilience seeks to enhance the system's inherent 
capacity to respond throughout the process of inevitable change - both long and short 
duration, thus invoking a fundamentally temporal perspective. Changes in the IoT include 
that software will be updated and that new versions must be installed, either over the air 
or during physical maintenance operations, both of which may or may not be easily 
feasible or recommended for medical wearable devices and connected cars. This 
emphasises a shift from event orientation and specific protective measures toward a 
capacity-centric view, stipulating four key attributes of resilient systems: robustness 
(withstand disruptive forces), redundancy (satisfy functional requirements with 
substitutable system elements), resourcefulness (effectively leverage resources to 
diagnose and solve problems), and rapidity (recover quickly from a disruption). In 
contrast with a risk-based view, which is focused on preventing intrusions (avoiding the 
risk) or anticipating its negative consequences, a resilience-based approach is concerned 
with ensuring continuity in critical functions and services with minimal disruption in the 
case of unexpected failure59. Resilience in the context of the cyber domain can be 
described as “the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse 
conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on cyber resources”.60 
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• Capability for graceful failures  
Some learning could be gained from the capability for 'graceful failure' that has been 
implemented in industrial systems61. 'Graceful failure' allows the system to slow down 
and adapt, so that the failing system is still able to deliver the minimum services it needs 
to provide, and the critical functions are not affected, especially when risks are life-
threatening.62 
• How much decision-making should we leave to machines?  
To what extent does society want to rely on systems that are largely autonomous, for 
applications that can be life-critical or -threatening? 
While machines have the ability to question and use data until they have uncovered all 
the unexpected correlations, they still lack the personal experience or emotional 
intelligence to understand these relationships or act on them.  
• Autonomy of the digital world  
Next to the natural and physical world and the human world (social system), the digital 
world has its own existence: its own life, rules and autonomy.63 It is becoming 
autonomous, with progress in the IoT occurring in parallel to progress in robotics, smart 
interactive networks, machine learning, artificial intelligence64, data sciences, deep 
learning or self-healing systems that are trained to learn to remedy their deficiencies. If 
the digital world acquires its autonomy, increasingly independent from the capacity of 
humans to control it, then the rules of behaviours in this world must be understood (as 
far as they result from emergent properties) or created (as far as organisations and 
individuals interact with it). Rules are needed to deal with governance issues, such as 
what can be done and what must not be done in this world. There is already ongoing 
debates about ethical issues, rights of robots, how machines such as autonomous and 
connected cars would decide if they are faced with a question of values or ethics. 
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Notes 
 
In order to reflect the general public opinion and experts’ personal opinions about the fast-
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